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I still have a vivid memory, after more than twenty years, of the first
time I saw William Crosskey. During the summer of 1947, he was
teaching a course at Chicago in constitutional history in which I was
enrolled as a student. On the opening day of the term, he arrived in
the classroom a few minutes late, thumped the four volumes of Farrand's The Records of the Federal Convention onto the desk in front
of him with a loud bang, and began substantially as follows:
You have all heard, gentlemen, that James Madison is the
father of the Constitution; that Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.,
of Massachusetts was our greatest Supreme Court justice; and
that Louis Dembitz Brandeis was the leading authority on
the jurisdiction of the federal courts. Before I finish this
summer, I propose to demonstrate to you that Madison was a
forger-he tampered with the notes he kept of the debates at
the federal constitutional convention in order to suit his own
political advantage and that of his party. Holmes undoubtedly knew a great deal about old English law, but he was not
the most eminent authority on American constitutional history. As for Brandeis, his opinion in Erie v. Tompkins'
demonstrates that he did not understand the true meaning
of the judiciary provisions in Article III of the Constitution.
There was a stirring in the classroom at this assault on our youthful
deities. Before he was finished that summer, Crosskey did indeed convince many of us that Madison's notes of the Philadelphia deliberations (published after the death of every member of the convention)
were not a trustworthy source in many respects. Holmes remains for
me a great human spirit (no one could read his speeches and his correspondence with Pollock and conclude otherwise), and I still think
of Brandeis as the preeminent legal craftsman to sit on the Supreme
Court in recent times. But Crosskey's teaching removed them from
the pedestal and enabled us to see them in a realistic perspective. I
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believe that an important phase of our legal education began for
many of us in the classroom that June morning two decades ago.
Crosskey was a most unusual man. He was an iconoclast, boldly
original, and an exponent of ideas regarded as heresy by many orthodox constitutional historians; and yet he was an innately conservative
man. In spirit, he was a New Englander and a Federalist. His cast of
mind is illuminated by the dedication to his book: "To the Congress
of the United States, In the Hope That It May Be Led To Claim and
Exercise For the Common Good of the Country the Powers Justly
Belonging To It Under the Constitution."
Crosskey had been an exceptional student in the mid-twenties at
the Yale Law School. He was subsequently selected by Chief Justice
Taft as his legal secretary, and from Washington he went to Wall
Street where he became a personal assistant to John W. Davis. In the
early 1930's, Crosskey was called upon as a young lawyer to advise
clients concerning the newly enacted Securities and Exchange Act. He
became intrigued by the arguments concerning the constitutionality
of the statute, and when he received an invitation in 1937 from Robert Hutchins to join the law faculty at Chicago, he accepted, intending
only to write an article on the subject. As matters developed, he devoted the next fifteen years to the research and writing of his remarkable book: Politicsand the Constitution.
The central theme of Crosskey's book is that the founding fathers
intended by the Constitution to establish a national government, fully
empowered to accomplish all of the objectives recited in the Preamble; they did not intend, in his view, to create a government, as generally believed, of limited and enumerated powers. Congress was intended to have general legislative authority to pass all laws necessary
and proper in its judgment for the general welfare and the common
defense. The Supreme Court was designed to become the juridical
head of a unified national system of administering justice, supreme
on all points of law over both federal and state courts. The President
was granted general executive authority to insure domestic tranquility. The states, on the other hand, were to have a very subordinate
and limited role.
The central non-military power granted Congress in the Constitution is its authority "to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and
among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes." Crosskey believed that once the intended plenary scope of this power was understood, his thesis that Congress was to have general legislative power
would be more credible, and the rest of his contentions would come
into focus. The Supreme Court interprets the word "States" in this

The University of Chicago Law Review

[Vol. 35:229

clause to mean the "territorial divisions of the country"; commerce
"among the several States" is thus "commerce from the territory of
one of our states to that of another," an idea subsumed in the phrase
"interstate commerce." Crosskey's thesis-supported by a vast mass of
documentation-was that the word "States" in the Commerce Clause
was understood when the Constitution was written to refer to "the
people of the states" and the term "commerce" comprehended "all
gainful activity." In his words, the Commerce Clause was understood
in 1787 as a "simple and exhaustive catalogue of all the different kinds
of commerce to which the people of the United States had access:
commerce, that is, with the people of foreign nations, commerce
with the people of the Indian tribes, and commerce among the people
2
of the several states."
Proceeding from the Commerce Clause, Crosskey undertook to account for the precise phrasing of each provision of the Constitution.
Clauses whose meaning or background has hitherto been obscurethe Full Faith and Credit Clause, the Imports and Exports Clause,
the prohibitions against enactment of ex-post-facto laws, the Piracy
Clause-emerged in a totally new light.
Crosskey believed the Constitution could properly be understood
only in the context of the actual events which preceded it and in light
of the politics and economics, the law and the language of the age
when it was written. He maintained that the Constitution should be
interpreted as it was understood by an intelligent, well informed person in 1787. His guiding principle was Holmes' rule of documentary
interpretation: "We ask, not what this man meant, but what those
words would mean in the mouth of a normal speaker of English using
them in the circumstances in which they were used." Crosskey viewed
with scorn the notion that the Constitution is a "living document" to
be brought into harmony with the times by the Supreme Court. "Did
you ever see a living document?" he would growl. If the Constitution
was in some way inadequate to the needs of the time, there was a procedure established for its amendment.8
The Constitution is written in the idiom of the 18th century, and
Crosskey felt that some of the misunderstandings of the document
were connected with failure to understand this idiom and to perceive
2 W. CROSSIBEY, POLiTICS AND THE CONSTTUON IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATEs 77
(1953). The discussion of the commerce clause occupies the first eight chapters of the
book following the introduction.
3 Lest Crosskey be thought outlandish, it should be noted that at least one present
member of the Supreme Court, Justice Hugo Black, subscribes in essence to this principle of constitutional interpretation. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 364, 37374 (1967) (Black, J., dissenting).
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changes in the usage of certain key words which occurred with the
passage of time. As he put it: "One is prone to assume that when
words abide, meanings remain; yet some 15 decades of cultural change
-and their restless impact upon language-lie between us and the
words of the Constitution."' 4 Crosskey sought to create a specialized
dictionary of 18th century word usages-which he felt was essential to
a correct understanding of the Constitution-on the basis of examples
drawn from contemporaneous newspapers, pamphlets, letters, public
documents, and the like. His methodology, whether or not one agrees
with his conclusions, surely stands as a contribution to American legal
history of the very first magnitude.
Strange as it may seem to those unfamiliar with his work, the structure of government which emerged from Crosskey's reading of the
Constitution in conformity with 18th century canons of documentary
interpretation is in nearly every respect suitable for the atomic age.
Crosskey was gifted with great analytical power; there are few men
who could equal his ability in amassing, assimilating, and organizing
vast masses of material. It would be difficult to exaggerate the dedication, the immense industry, the range and sweep of the research, and
the painstaking attention to detail which went into his book.
A number of discerning critics-Judge Charles E. Clark, at one
time Dean of the Yale Law School and later Chief Judge of the Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit; Walton Hamilton; and Malcolm
Sharp, to name only three-believed that Crosskey had written a great
book, deserving of the widest attention. But they were in a minority,
and his book was attacked, sometimes ferociously, by various commentators.6 Some went so far as to impugn his intellectual integritya charge which was preposterous to those privileged to know him.
The fact remains, however, that his book has not had widespread
influence.
There are a number of factors which may account for the failure of
Crosskey's work to receive its just recognition. In the first place, when
Crosskey began to write his book in the middle 1930's during the
depths of the depression, the problems with which he dealt were burning public issues. The Supreme Court had struck down a number of
New Deal statutes, and Roosevelt's court-packing plan had excited
4 W. HAMILTON 9- D. ADAIR, THE POWER TO Govm' 42 (1937).
5 Judge Clark hailed the book "as a major scholastic effort of our times." Clark, Professor Crosskey and the Brooding Omnipresence of Erie-Tompkins, 21 U. CHI. L. REv. 24
(1953); Hamilton, The Constitution-Apropos of Crosskey, 21 U. CHI. L. REv. 79 (1953);
Sharp, Book Review, 54 CoLum. L. REv. 439 (1954).
6 See, e.g., Goebel, Ex Parte Clio, 54 CoLum. L REv. 450 (1954); Brown, Book Review,
67 HAv. L. Rv.1439 (1954); Hart, Book Review, 67 HAv.L REv. 1456 (1954).
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intense controversy. But by the beginning of World War II, and certainly by 1953 when Crosskey's book was published, the power of the
federal government to deal effectively with the nation's problems had
been largely settled. For example, congressional power over commerce
is now recognized to be almost complete. It is true that gaps remainthere is still substantial question, for example, whether the Congress
could enact a Uniform Commercial Code which would be applicable
to all commerce throughout the country, intrastate as well as interstate, or whether Congress could pass a Uniform National Corporations Act, so that the country would at long last enjoy the obvious advantages of uniform commercial law. But these issues are scarcely a
source of great public controversy.
In the second place, Crosskey's ideas require a major readjustment
in thinking for those interested in constitutional law. The highly
charged reaction of some critics to Crosskey's book reflects the deep
emotional commitment which many men have to the views Crosskey
so vigorously attacked. Moreover, the force of Crosskey's rhetoric was
not calculated to disarm his critics.
Finally, it must be acknowledged that Crosskey was not a skillful
popularizer of his ideas. He had little patience with or interest in the
politics of academia, which may be essential to gaining extensive attention for one's views. Crosskey was innocent of the art of extricating
money from foundations so that he could surround himself with graduate fellows and research assistants who would then go forth to carry
his views to the world. He did not write articles for law reviews or
spend his time in making speeches. He was a scholar, and he had little
interest in popularization.
Crosskey will be remembered by his students as a great teacher.
He could hold a class spellbound. Who among those who studied with
him will ever forget Gouverneur Morris, or the case of Huidekoper's
Lessee v. Douglass,7 or the phrase "tub for the whale" (the derisive
characterization of the tenth amendment by Federalists)?8 Crosskey
7 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 1 (1805). For his discussion of the case, see CRossKEY, supra note 2,
Ch. 23. Crosskey demonstrated that in Huidekoper, the Supreme Court, in a diversity
case, substituted its own interpretation of a state statute respecting title to real property

for that of the state's highest court, and the Supreme Court's construction was thereafter
followed. Contrast this with the present view of the Supreme Court that it is constitutionally required to follow the precedents on points of state law and common law by the
state courts, including even intermediate state appellate courts and state trial courts. See
Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938); West v. American T. & T. Co., 311
U.S. 223 (1940); Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Field, 311 U.S. 169 (1940).
8 See CaossuuY, supra note 2, at 688. The phrase was derived from Jonathan Swifts
The Tale of A Tub: "Seamen have a custom when they meet a whale, to fling him out
an empty tub by way of amusement to divert him from laying violent hands upon the
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was greatly admired by his students, but some felt that he was a forbidding figure. I found, on personal acquaintance, that like so many
men of gruff demeanor, he was in fact a sensitive and kindly man. He
was also a man of wit. I recall on one occasion he had been discussing
the intricacies of the federal common law and Holmes' opinion in the
Black & White Taxicab case. 9 Crosskey had attempted, in a variety of
ways, to make a point critical of Holmes' position. One member of
the class, Milton Shadur, then Editor-in-Chief of this Law Review and
now a distinguished member of the Chicago bar, had persisted in arguing against Crosskey's point. Finally, with a snort of exasperation,
Crosskey turned to him and said, "Shadur, you don't want to be like
Oliver Wendell Holmes, do you?"
He was a gallant man. During the closing years of his life, he suffered from an arthritic condition and nearly every movement was
painful for him. He nonetheless continued to teach and to travel to
various libraries and other document repositories. It is tragic that
Crosskey did not live to finish the volumes of his work dealing with
the events preceding the constitutional convention, the convention
debates, and the ratification campaign.
It was Holmes who once remarked that the study of history is valuable because it "sets us free and enables us to make up our minds dispassionately" about various problems. Perhaps that was Crosskey's
greatest contribution to his students: he helped liberate them from
the feeling that history and authority dictate only one solution and
opened their minds to other alternatives. It was an invaluable lesson.
ship." In contemporaneous discussions of the tenth amendment, the phrase conveyed the
thought that the amendment would divert the attention of statesrighters who wished to
alter the scheme of power between the states and the nation established by the original
constitution.

9 Black 8&White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown &cYellow Taxicab &cTransfer Co.,
276 U.S. 518, 532 (1928).

